Intro: The given question dictates us to consider the case of unification under the specific form of a federal state (which is unlikely). The reasons why some countries would oppose Korean unification could vary according to the method and stance that unified Korea would take. However, all 4 great powers surrounding the peninsula will oppose in general because according to Realism, states are the most important, self-interested, rational actors prioritizing their national security. They favor the status quo to avoid destabilization and disruption of regional BOP as overriding effects of unification. The 4 countries can stop unification through exercising their veto power against recognizing unified Korea as members of the UN Security Council (Japan=non-permanent mbr in 2009). Nevertheless, under Game theory, each will base its decision-making on maximizing gains or minimizing losses under conditions of uncertainty, ranking order preferences, estimating probabilities, and considering what others will do.
US will oppose to this unification which is not under a democratic, US-allied government (c.f. Democratic Peace Theory) but under NK's policy of unification (retaining each side's leadership without outside interference). US views that such unification will strengthen revisionist NK which maintains its regime and alliance to China. US will see a greater possibility of conflict between stronger China (backed by NK) and itself (c.f. Power transition theory). Also, US needs unstable, nuclear NK to maintain its army in the region (curbing China’s expansion), to promote Democracy in Asia, to justify its war against terrorism, and to sell weapons to NK-threatened countries. So under Hegemonic Stability Theory, the American unipolar structure will compel the US to take action against Korean unification to stabilize the system. US will form a regional consortium to stop unification by “forcefully persuading” Korea to pursue gradual unification by peaceful and democratic means (also, under the Rational Actor model, US government, as primary actor, examines, evaluates, and chooses goals and methods). The lack of a multilateral security structure in the region to cushion the shock will give the US leeway to interfere in the regional BOP. In addition, as is the norm, US will continue to exert smart power, strategically using diplomacy, persuasion(=soft, weightless power), capacity building, and projection of power (military) to make SK turn away from the NK-form of unification and remain a faithful ally to the US.
China may favor unification under this form because NK can still serve as a strategic buffer and the effects (refugees, etc.) would be minor than from the collapse of NK regime. However, China will worry that unification may divert SK investment from China to NK instead. Nevertheless, China will not use force to stop unification because it would elicit a response from unified Korea and others resulting in damage (c.f. Deterrence theory). Instead, China (great power) will side with the US (superpower) in opposition to share in the tasks of maintaining the system and controlling the allocation of power, (c.f. concept of Hierarchy) just like it has recently shown support for US during the nuclear crisis in NK by brokering the six-party talks. Also, US-China cooperation will occur through the international regime affecting the behavior of states (c. f. Realist approach to Regime theory).
Japan will oppose unification which is not under a democratic government, for such unification will not resolve Japan’s fears of NK but still present the disadvantages of unification, which is the rise of Korea's potential to become a major regional power[1]. If united, Korea will combine the world's 4th and 6th largest military (1 million)[2] with NK's chemical weapons (if nukes are abandoned) and SK's high-tech gadgets and pose a security dilemma. According to Defensive Realism, Japan thinks that its survival is best attained by pursuing just enough power to achieve a balance where no one other power can threaten it[3]. Although united Korea presents a partner with which it can counterbalance China, Japan can view united Korea as a threat itself. Japan's defensive realist objectives to ensure stability and favorable alterations to the status quo would lead it to seek alignment with the US to oppose unification (it will not take aggressive action to stop the unification either). Since it considers US an ally and not a threatening power, it will choose bandwagoning over balancing.
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