Old vs. New School in Thinking about IR in East Asia:
Do traditional western theories really “get Asia wrong”?
This critical review essay compares and analyzes three articles assigned for the first week of class on the subject of “contending theories in East Asian Relations.” The three articles in focus are: “Ripe for rivalry” by Friedberg, “Will Asia’s past be its future?” by Acharya, and “Hierarchy, Balancing and Empirical puzzles in Asian International Relations” by Kang. Whereas the article by Friedberg is an excellent representation of the traditional, classical notion (since it was written in 1993) that many scholars, policy makers and even regular citizens harbored, the other two articles by Acharya and Kang are the epitomes of a more progressive and novel thinking (they were written more recently, in 2003) in the realm of international relations of East Asia. Kang and Acharya’s articles are almost like a dialogue, acknowledging and rebutting each other’s assertions and at the same time making inferences and criticisms from Friedberg’s article. In addition to these articles, this review essay also takes into account Kang’s article “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytic Frameworks” which is the original subject of Acharya’s commentary.
This critical review essay provides a detached evaluation weighing the coherence and completeness of the articles assertions evidences. It briefly outlines the authors’ main ideas, important facts and lines of reasoning. It then gives a personal evaluation of the author's work, assessing the presented facts and the logical consistency of the author's argument.
The ideas presented in Friedberg’s article “Ripe for Rivalry” have been predominant in the academic and political landscape of International Relations theories in East Asia. This classical realist western scholar examines Asia with realism as his stethoscope and gives an overall grim diagnosis: that the prospects of East Asian peace are dampened by uncertainties and dangers, and that Asia will not lack for crises (Friedberg, 31).
Kang takes a strong position refuting the existing realist claim. His argument is that applying theories derived from European history to Asia has led IR scholars (notably Friedberg) to the short-sighted analysis that Asia is “ripe for rivalry.” According to Kang, mainstream realist theoretical approaches to IR in Asia pay little attention to both ancient and modern historical and empirical record (Kang, 58). As an example, Kang writes about his query on the lack of balancing behavior by Asian countries against China for which a more comprehensive historical perspective could be applied. He asserts that because IR in East Asia has historically been hierarchic, the rise of China would ensure regional stability rather than disrupting it (Kang, 66). Kang elaborates saying that he examines Asian history not because history repeats itself but because it proves that Asia does not function like the Europe.
Acharya opens his paper by praising Kang for his challenge of the early pessimists’ view on post cold war Asia (149) but questions Kang’s other claims. For example, Acharya doubts Kang’s use of evidence in suggesting that Asian states are more likely to bandwagon with China than balance against it. He voices his opinion that “the Asian engagement approach toward China should not be confused with bandwagoning and deference for there is no reason to believe that Asia’s past hierarchy was peaceful or that Asians today would naturally gravitate toward a hierarchal order” (164). He states that “Although regional actors may find a strong and stable China preferable, this does not mean that a regional hierarchy dominated by China would be peaceful and legitimate” (158). Acharya also states that Kang’s “arguments about regional responses to the rise of China, and his concepts of hierarchy beg for greater clarity and explanation” (163). Acharya warns Kang of the peril in basing his alternative scenarios on cultural historicist arguments, for there are “important structural and normative differences between the past and present militate against Asia’s return to a neo-Confucian order” (163) and because there are other non-cultural sources of regional order, such as economic interdependence, norms, and institutions that should be taken into account (164).
Faced with strong criticisms, Kang stresses in his second article “Hierarchy, Balancing and Empirical puzzles in Asian International Relations” that in studying Asia, IR scholars should be less Eurocentric and take into account the empirical anomalies specific to Asia.
The literature review of these article leads into asking the question: “Does Western IR theory really “get Asia wrong”? Although what western IR theorists such as Friedberg predicted negatively about Asia has not eventuated, this fact should not be a reason to rush into the conclusion that Western IR theory is totally inappropriate or insufficient to be applied to Asia. Despite the fact that Kang and Acharya proposed a more avant-garde, and perhaps more Asian view, Friedberg’s assertions could not be discarded as rusty or obsolete. Adopting new ideas does not have to come at the cost of rejecting the old. The debate upon the appropriateness of IR theories in Asia might be a matter of perspective and Friedman’s article still hold some water.
Considering whether Western IR theories could relate to Asian international politics could be done while dealing with Kang’s assumptions and many of his statements. Kang claims that “[Western IR theory] do a poor job as they are applied to Asia” (58). However, he mostly focuses on realism as the Western IR theory that ‘gets Asia wrong’, and says that many of his criticisms could apply to other international relations theories such as liberalism or constructivism (58). He admits that “constructivist perspective has addressed topics including the formation of identity, prostitution and its relationship to U.S overseas troop deployment” (60).
Kang should have pondered upon the definition of “Western IR theory” and what dictates the failure or inadequacy of a theory. International Cooperation class at GSIS teaches that IR theories, just as any other theories, seek to better understand social reality for better policy-making towards a favorable environment. The fact that most IR theories were developed in the West does not indicate that those theories cannot be applied to Asia. Western scholars have based these theories upon careful reflection on human nature and behaviors which are not completely different in Asia. There are some Western IR theories which relate to Asia such as (neo-) realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Realists consider a country’s power in terms of military, economic and political strength believing that these would secure stability and peace. Asserting that the realist theory was proven false for it failed to produce the predicted outcomes once (that Asia will see regional rivalry) is overly hasty. Although predicted outcomes might have not occurred, Realism has been proven as valid in numerous situations and has stood the test of time.
Liberalists take into account domestic power politics, economic interests, history, culture, identity and institutions, which could be important tools to interpret regional trends in Asia. Furthermore, the overarching framework of constructivism can also be applied to the region because people tend to base decisions on former experience, be it at the individual level or national level. The fact that Friedman could not be an optimist on the Asian issue is because of the past situation in which Asian countries were involved in an arms race.
Acharya, although agreeing with Kang, also uses the frameworks of western IR theories for his analysis on Asia. He says that the new order in Asia with the rise of China should be “managed, rather than dependent on Chinese benevolence (a culturalist assumption)”, and that “Realists might see the management as a function of a U.S.-led balance of power, liberals and constructivists as that of interdependence, norms, and institutions” (158). His explanation for the absence European-style institutions in Asia (159) uses constructivism, which looks at the actors’ behaviors as a product of history. He says that “Asian regionalism, unlike its European variant, has not been transformative but conservative and norm preserving” (164) because of historical events that rendered Asian countries to overvalue national sovereignty and non-interference.
Besides his former claim, Kang’s use of history and culture as self-sufficient variables explaining that bandwagoning best characterizes IR in the region instead of balancing presents room for criticisms. He should have assessed further the causal mechanisms he used, supporting his view with other precise methodologies such as comparative historical analysis and game theories. The mechanisms he used are not adequate to explain why Confucian notions of hierarchy matters in present-day Asia. He must have further elaborated his claim by comparing Asia under Chinese tributary system of 206 B.C. with the contemporary Asia to demonstrate that this pattern of hierarchy carries on in Asian interstate system to this day.
This paper muses on whether traditional or modern thinking in Asian IR would be more satisfactory and concludes that due to the lack of logic, evidences and mechanisms regarding the new theories proposed by Kang and Acharya, those theories are not entirely sufficient to drive out the traditional western IR theories completely. Both schools of theories should coexist and be better developed to fill in the gaps in explaining IR in East Asia.
References
Acharya, Amitav. "Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?." International Security 28, no. 3 (Winter 2003/04): 149-164.
Friedberg, Aaron 'Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia', International Security, 18/3 (1993).
Kang, David C. "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytic Frameworks," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Summer 2003): 57-85.
Kang, David C. "Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations." International Security 28, no. 3 (Winter 2003/04): 165-180.
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